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This work explores the roles of potential simultaneity and heterogeneity in 
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Italian manufacturing firms. Partnerships with other firms, research institutions, 
universities and other small centres are considered jointly by applying a multivariate 
probit specification. This allows for systematic correlations among different 
cooperation choices. The results support the hypothesis that the four cooperation 
decisions are interdependent. The decision to cooperate in R&D differs significantly 
depending on the cooperation options. Public support, the researcher intensity and 
the size are all of importance in determining R&D alliance strategies. 
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In recent years investment in research and development has been 
widely recognised as an important factor in driving innovation and 
economic growth. Firms have spent considerable resources on R&D, in 
order to improve their innovations and their technological skills by 
means of new R&D organisational practices and external partnerships. 
Cooperation has become crucial in the innovation process particularly in 
sectors where innovation is becoming the more and more complex. 
Indeed for an increasing numbers of firms internal R&D is no longer the 
only way to innovate and they have started technological collaboration 
with a variety of partners. Alliances with other firms in R&D can allow 
them to access external resources and stimulate knowledge transfer, 
resource exchange, and organizational learning (Becker and Dietz 2004). 
Firms also use R&D partnerships to access information and build R&D 
networks. Aiello and Cardamone (2008), for instance, show that R&D 
spillovers have a positive effect on firms' production. Aschhoff and 
Smidt (2008) investigate the effect of past R&D cooperation on a firm's 
current innovative performance and find that joint research activities 
have a positive effect on the success of process innovations.  
For all these reasons frequent and heterogeneous knowledge 
exchanges have been a crucial driving force for the growing number of 
domestic and international technological alliances in recent decades. 
R&D partnerships have attracted political and academic interest. 
National governments and the European Union have pursued policies to 
support research which are clearly aimed at stimulating technological 
partnerships.  
This work investigates the determining factors that influence the 
decision of firms to undertake cooperative research, and checks for 
possible interdependence among different research alliance strategies. 
The analysis is carried out on a sample of Italian manufacturing firms. 
Italy is one of the advanced countries which lags behind both in terms of 
R&D spending and the amount of R&D collaboration. Hence from this 
perspective Italy is a litmus test for R&D related issues.  
Most previous research has investigated the frequency of R&D 
collaboration, in order to identify which characteristics result to be more 
beneficial to R&D alliances (Fritsch and Lukas 2001;; Narula 2002). Some 
scholars have focused particularly on the simultaneous relationship 
between R&D partnerships and intramural research activities. They 
generally conclude that the level of internal R&D investment still plays 
an important role in determining whether a firm will participate in 
technological alliances (Becker and Dietz 2004;; Cassiman and Veugelers 
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2002;; Colombo and Garrone 1996;; Veugelers 1997). This line of 
argument is explicitly followed in this work. 
The econometric framework is based on the multivariate probit 
specification. This allows to explore whether firms consider different 
cooperation agreements simultaneously in order to maximise results. By 
applying a system method of estimation for dichotomous variables this 
model is suitable for estimating how the characteristics that influence the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Several 
authors have recently highlighted the possible complementarity between 
various forms of R&D partnership (Belderbos et al. 2004,a;; Veugelers 
and Cassiman, 2003).  
The results from the multivariate analysis support the idea of 
interdependence between the four cooperation decisions considered 
(non-zero correlations in the stochastic components that refer to the 
different types of R&D cooperation). To be more precise, correlations 
indicate complementarity among R&D collaboration strategies when 
there are universities among the partners, while they suggest substitution 
effects between partnership with small centres, institutional research 
centres and other firms. Coefficients also differ sensibly across the 
equations, revealing heterogeneity in the cooperation strategies, and this 
supports the use of of these disaggregated R&D cooperation types 
instead of one aggregated R&D cooperation indicator. 
The analysis indicates that participating in a public R&D 
programme has ?????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????
decision to cooperate. Firms with higher absorption capacity, expressed 
here as the number of R&D workers over total employees, are more 
inclined to participate in research partnerships. This supports the 
hypothesis that internal technological skills are crucial for taking 
advantage of externally acquired knowledge. The results also indicate 
that firm size has a positive impact on the choice of strategy. Lastly, 
receiving production inputs and services from external partners is 
significantly important only for the group of firms collaborating with 
other firms suggesting that industrial networks may facilitate intra-firms 
collaboration. 
 
2. Motivation for R&D cooperation  
Recent academic work shows that the objectives and determining 
factors in research alliances may differ, depending on the characteristics 
of the R&D and the partners. Several arguments have been put forward 
to explain what motivates firms to participate in joint R&D projects. The 
most common reasons mentioned in theoretical and empirical literature 
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are: a) knowledge spillovers and b) cost/risk sharing. The motivation 
may be either one of these or a combination of the two (Tether 2002). 
For spillovers, one must distinguish between incoming and outgoing 
spillovers. Incoming spillovers depend on whether the firm can absorb 
and use knowledge produced by other firms. In such cases partnerships 
may result in superior learning efficiency. In these models access to 
complementary knowledge (Aurora and Gambardella, 1990;; Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990;; Vonortas, 1994;; Belderbos et al. 2004,a;; Miotti and 
Sachwald, 2003) is seen as a way to absorb, efficiently, resources from 
the partner in which the host firm is weak (Hagedoorn et al. 2000). 
Outgoing spillovers are those where internally generated 
knowledge flows out and benefits other firms. However spillovers are 
greatly affected by their heterogeneity and the appropriability conditions. 
For R&D activities which are close to basic research, for instance, the 
spillover level tends to be generally high. According to Belderbos et al. 
(2004,a) in collaborations between competitors the distance in basic 
research is less than that in collaborations with suppliers or customers. 
In joint research activities between universities and research institutes the 
distance is even less and thus the spillover level is highest. 
Nevertheless spillovers can be a problem if the firm does not have 
appropriate mechanisms to protect their know-how easily. However high 
appropriability constrains potential free-riding and generally leads to low 
flows of spillovers. To be more precise, alliances with competitors tend 
to have the highest appropriability following that with institutional 
partners and vertical collaboration.  
Legal protection and strategy protection may be a way of 
preventing rivals from accessing commercial information. From the 
strategic perspective, R&D partnerships may be of great help for 
internalising information (Steurs 1995;; De Bondt, 1996;; Cassiman and 
Veugelers 2002;; Belderbos et al. 2004a;; Lopez, 2008) and for 
overcoming market failures in the innovation ??????????? ?????????????
Jacquemin, 1988;; Kamien et al. 1992;; De Bondt, 1996). 
Research cooperation is often seen as a way of sharing share risks 
and costs, which are usually high at the R&D stage, and also as a way of 
exploiting economies of scale and scope in R&D (Sakakibara 1997;; 
Beath et al. 1998;; Tether, 2002). Risks and costs hinder R&D, and 
?????????????? ???? ??? ???? ???? ??? ??????????? ?????? ?? ??????? ???????? ???
reduce costs also depends on several factors such as the type of R&D, 
complementarities, size, and the intensity of the R&D. The more R&D 
activities are related to basic research, the higher the reduction in costs is 
likely to be (Kaiser, 2002).  
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Both knowledge spillovers and cost/risk reduction are closely 
related to the absorptive capacity of the firms. Many studies have 
emphasized that firms must be capable of absorbing and using 
knowledge effectively if they are to benefit from external knowledge 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1989;; Griffith et al. 2004;; Bönte and Keilbach, 
2005). A fir???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
may encourage them to repeat the experience as well as making them 
more technically capable of doing so. This is crucial for assimilating and 
exploiting the external available knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989;; 
Negassi, 2004). This latter depends, in turn, on the intensity of its R&D 
and the level of human capital. 
A firm engaged in R&D can choose between different strategies. It 
can generate the R&D internally or in relationship with outside 
organizations. In the latter case, it may choose to purchase technical 
information or to undertake research projects jointly with external 
partners. Several papers have studied the substitutability or 
complementarity of internal and external R&D (Aurora and 
Gambardella, 1990;; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990;; Veugelers and 
Cassiman, 1999). In particular Belderbos et al. (2004, a) found that the 
factors that determine whether or not a firm decides to collaborate in 
R&D with external parties varied considerably. 
 
3 Data and variables description 
The data used in this study are taken from the Survey of 
Manufacturing Firms (SMF) carried out by the Area Studi of Capitalia 
Bank (2003). The SMF surveyed a stratified sample of Italian firms with 
11 to 500 employees. It also included all manufacturing firms with more 
than 500 employees. The data was stratified according to the number of 
employees, the sector, and the geographical location. It used the Census 
of Italian Firms as a benchmark. The SMF contains questionnaire 
information about firms' structure and behaviour and fifteen years of 
data on their balance sheets (1989-2003). Unfortunately, since only a 
fraction of the firms overlap in the surveys, access to longitudinal data is 
constrained by the loss of a considerable amount of observations on the 
dependent variables employed in this work. Hence only the 2001-2003 
survey is used in the empirical application. This obviously prevents from 
including long-term considerations in the analysis. 
The survey contains information on the total amount of R&D 
investment and the amount of R&D investment dedicated to projects 
with external partners. This latter information is used to construct the 
variables of observation (dependent) considered in this work which are 
four dichotomous variables referring to four collaborative groups namely 
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alliances with other firms (COLLFIRMS), research institutions 
(COLLCENTRES), universities (COLLUNI), and other small centres 
(COLLOTHER). These latter are small private research centres and 
professionals who support firms in projecting and designing products 
and/or processes. 
There are three questions in the survey that can be used to evaluate a 
??????? ???????? ??? ??????? ???? ??????? ??????? ?????????? ?) whether at the 
current market interest rate the firm wants additional credit;; 2) whether 
the firm is willing to pay a higher interest rate to obtain that additional 
credit;; 3) whether the firm has applied for this credit but it has been 
????????????????????????????????????????e second or third questions, it is 
considered to be credit rationed. This variable is used in the empirical 
analysis as a proxy for a firm's financial distress. 
 
3.1 Variables affecting cooperation and background 
Among the regressors the model includes a dummy variable 
indicating whether the firm received R&D subsidies during the three 
year period (GRANTR&D). Market failures in real and financial markets 
offer justification for public support, as the return may be not sufficient 
to justify private investment. As a result, public funding tends to have a 
????????? ?????????? ??? ??????? ???? ????????? (Carboni, 2011) and an 
indirect influence on the propensity to co-operate in R&D (Veugelers, 
1997), since they might help to mitigate barriers to cooperation (Busom 
and Ribas, 2007).  
Since participation and R&D collaboration may be determined 
simultaneously, there could be a positive correlation between subsidies 
and cooperation, due to a simultaneous relationship between the two 
rather than as a result of subsidies. Estimates of the effects of policy will 
be inconsistent unless this issue is properly considered (Colombo and 
Garrone, 1996;; Veugelers, 1997;; Kaiser, 2002). Indeed a public agency is 
likely to decide whether or not to award a public grant depending on 
certain characteristics of the firm or project. However the Italian 
National law N. 46/82, which covers the most important R&D grants 
awarded to the sample of firms used in this work, does not specifically 
require the applicants to engage in innovative activities jointly with other 
partners.  
Despite this it is tested the possible endogeneity of this variable by 
performing a Durbin?Wu?Hausman test. Hence the R&D collaboration 
variable (COLLALL) is regressed on the set of covariates there will be 
used in the multivariate analysis below, employing the total amount of 
industry grant per worker as an instrument that affects the potentially 
endogenous variable, but has no significant effect on the COLLALL 
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equation. This latter is then regressed including the same set of 
covariates and the residuals from the first stage. Exclusion restrictions 
are: the instrument, the export and the debt dummies, as they do not 
significantly affect the collaboration equation (Davidson and 
MacKinnon, 1993). The results of the Hausman test shown in the 
appendix (table A.1) suggest that the R&D subsidies variable is not 
endogenous to research partnerships.  
A measure of stable R&D commitment is included as an explanatory 
variable. Such variable is the number of R&D workers as a percentage of 
total workers and it is expressed in logarithm (LogEMPR&D-EMPL(2001)). 
This provides a proxy for ?? ??????? engagement in R&D and 
??????? ????? ??? ?? ??????? ?????? ???????? ??????????? ?? ??????? ??????????
capital is a crucial intangible asset in R&D cooperation partnerships. 
Many studies have emphasized that to absorb external knowledge, an 
effective absorptive capacity which is able to understand and use this 
knowledge is fundamental (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989;; Griffith et al. 
2004). Fritsch and Lukas (2001), Belderbos et al. (2004,a) and Hernan et 
al. (2003) found that firms engaged in R&D cooperation tend to have a 
higher share of R&D employees. 
A stable R&D structure has a positive influence on the propensity of 
firms to cooperate in R&D projects (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989;; 
Kleinknecht and Reijnen, 1992;; Veugelers, 1997;; Bayona et al. 2001). 
This is a factor that reduces risks while increasing the probability of 
finding partners. Particularly when the level of spillovers is high, 
cooperation research is associated with higher levels of R&D 
expenditure than competitors ??? ????????? ???? ??????????? ??????
Kamien et al. 1992). For example, Piga and Vivarelli (2004) found that 
????????????? ??? ??????? ?????????????????? ??? ??????? ??? ???? ?????????????
choice to carry out its own R&D activity and Leiponen (2001) suggested 
that a very large absorption capacity might be required when absorbing 
scientific knowledge from universities. 
Admittedly, also this variable might be simultaneously determined 
with collaboration, since collaboration can produce positive spillovers 
which may in turn stimulate firms to invest more in R&D. Nevertheless, 
R&D staff represents only a small proportion of all the workers in the 
firms considered (6-8 per cent). Hence, even though collaboration can 
have some influence on the number of R&D employees, it is very 
possible that this change is relatively small compared to the number of 
all workers (Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003). Furthermore, since they 
represent a more long-term expenditure than the R&D budget or 
intensity, they are likely to be less influenced by collaboration, which may 
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well be only temporary.1 These two arguments may reduce the severity 
of the potential endogeneity between collaboration and both the receipt 
of R&D subsidies and the researchers intensity.  
Following the mainstream literature, firm size is included as an 
explanatory variable. This variable is expressed as the logarithm of the 
number of employees and refers to the initial year (LogEMP(2001)). Most 
empirical studies show the importance of firm size in predicting whether 
a firm will engage in cooperative R&D (Sakakibara, 1997;; Veugelers, 
1997;; Bayonaet al. 2001;; Fritsch and Lukas, 2001;; Miotti and Sachwald, 
2003). Larger firms are also more likely to have the absorptive capacity 
necessary for benefitting more from R&D cooperation. However the 
relationship between firm size and joint research activities is not 
necessarily unambiguous. The effect of size may vary according to the 
partners and purposes of the partnership (Kleinknecht and Reijnen, 
1992;; Tether, 2002). 
Capital intensity, measured as physical assets per employee and 
expressed in logarithmic terms (Log(KINT)) is used to control for the fact 
that firms in more technology-intensive sectors may be more likely to 
engage in R&D partnerships than firms in more labour-intensive sectors.  
An export dummy (EXPORT) is included in the analysis. It is often 
claimed that firms that compete in foreign markets are more likely to 
innovate than others (Arnold and Hussinger, 2005) and hence more 
likely to collaborate. There may also be indirect effects, due to the richer 
network of customers, suppliers or competitors that exporting firms may 
have access to, which may make cooperation easier.  
Two controls for potential financial constraints are also included in 
the analysis. Financial constraints (RATION) are in general a good 
candidate for explaining under-investment in research and thus may 
possibly affect the amount of cooperative R&D. A measure of 
indebtedness is also considered in order to control for a firm's ability to 
find sources of finance to support the costs of R&D(DEBT2001). It is the 
                                                 
1 The decision to take part in an external research relationship and the decision 
on the R&D budget may be determined simultaneously. That is, R&D 
investments may increase if cooperation makes one's own R&D activities more 
efficient. Colombo and Garrone (1996), Veugelers (1997), and (Kaiser, 2002), 
for instance, find that using R&D intensity as an explanatory variable may 
produce endogeneity problems when exploring the choice of R&D cooperation. 
By contrast, Miotti and Sachwald (2003), and Cassiman and Veugelers (2002), in 
their study of French and Belgian firms, find that permanent R&D did not 





ratio of debt to banks over total average debts as an indicator of the 
firm's financial structure and refers to the initial period. GRANTOTHER is 
a dummy =1 if the firm received public grants other than R&D. 
A binary variable indicating whether a firm acquires inputs and 
services from outsourcing agreement (EXTSOU) is included among the 
regressors. The effect of such variable on collaboration is expected to be 
positive. Firms relying on outsourcing agreements for their production 
should find it easier to share technological knowledge with external 
partners since they can take advantage of the intra-industry distribution 
channels and contacts. 
Finally, industry dummies are employed to control for potential 
sectoral systematic differences in cooperation. These are: traditional 
????????????????????(PAVITT1), ??????-??????????(PAVITT2), ?????????????
?????????? ??????????? (PAVITT3), ???? ????????-??????(PAVITT4). The 
rationale for this is that there may be various aspects of technology such 
as technological opportunity, appropriateness, dynamic aspects and 
accumulation whose characteristics may differ among sectors. Hence, the 
attitude to R&D partnerships may be more positive in companies 
operating in sectors with relatively high R&D intensity. In addition in 
order to mitigate the simultaneity problem, wherever possible, variables 
refer to the initial period.  
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for R&D non-collaborative firms 
and for the four collaborative groups considered in this work. A total of 
1231 companies invested in research and 591 of these chose to co-
operate in R&D.  
R&D collaborative firms have more employees than non-
collaborative ones, whatever the type of partnership. This is particularly 
true in the case of partnerships with centres and universities. 
The same is true with regard to the level of research intensity (R&D 
expenditure per employee). Firms engaged in partnership with other 
firms and universities invested more ?????????????????????????????????). 
Interestingly, despite such differences, the percentage of researchers over 
total workers is very similar among all the groups.  
Collaborative firms also have higher capital intensity while the ratio 
of debts over added value is similar among the five groups, with the 
exception of the COLLFIRMS which appear to be less indebted. Credit 
rationed firms are more frequent in the COLLOTHER group (9 per cent) 
and less in the COLLUNI group (4 per cent). 
Public grants for R&D are not uniformly distributed among the 
firms. Collaborative firms make more use of public support than do 
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non-collaborative ones. The COLLFIRMS and the COLLUNI group in 
particular benefit most (39% and 43% respectively). The same is true for 
non-R&D grants. Contrary to prior expectations, there is no difference 
in involvement in the export market between collaborating and non-
collaborating firms. There emerge large differences concerning the 
outsourcing variable. Firms involved in research ventures show to be far 
more inclined to external acquisition of inputs and services whatever the 
type of collaboration.  
When looking at the industry classes, it is worth noting that the 
?????-????????????????????4) and the ??????-???????????????or (PAVITT2) 
are the least common among the firms in the sample and, with the 
exception of the COLLOTHER group (5 per cent), collaborating firms are 
always appreciably more technological than the non-collaborating ones 
(4 per cent)?? ???? ????????????? ???????? ???????1) is the most common 
among the firms, ranging from 31 per cent to 47 per cent?? ??pecialized 
?????????????????????(PAVITT3) are the second most important group. 
Bearing in mind that the two groups may also differ in their 
unobservable characteristics, the evidence from table (1) in support of 
the random hypothesis between collaborative firms and their non-
collaborative counterparts is not unambiguous. 
Among the 591 collaborating firms there are 161 firms which are 
involved in multiple R&D partnerships. Observing the combination of 
the various forms of collaboration (last four rows in table 1 and table 2), 
it emerges that COLLFIRMS are by far the most common (215 exclusive 
cases and 281 in total) and firms committed to this form of partnership 
tend to rely less on the remaining forms (12 per cent with research 
centres, 8 per cent with small private centres and 18 per cent with 
universities). COLLOTHER represents the second most common form 
(102 exclusive cases and 139 total). There are 96 firms engaged in two 
forms of alliance, 19 firms engaged in three types of collaboration and 
only 4 with all the four types of partnership considered.  
4 Multivariate probit analysis 
This section deals with the fact that firms may consider simultaneous 
different cooperation agreements in their maximization process. Possible 
complementarities between various forms of R&D collaboration have 
been recently highlighted by Veugelers and Cassiman, (2003) and 
Belderbos et al. (2004,a). The multivariate probit specification used here 
allows for systematic correlations between choices for different forms of 
cooperation. This model applies a system method of estimation for 
dichotomous variables. It is appropriate for estimating how the 
???????????????? ????? ?????????? ??????????????????????????? ???? ??????????????
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opting for a particular strategy, although it is not able to distinguish 
between the two sources of correlation. 
Theoretically such correlations may derive from complementarities 
or substitutabilities between different forms of cooperation. If there are 
correlations, the separate (probit) estimations of the cooperation 
decisions turn out to be inefficient. In such cases the multivariate limited 
dependent variable (multivariate probit) model on the binary decision of 
whether or not to engage in collaboration can be used. 
More precisely, the following analysis explores the role of potential 
simultaneity and heterogeneity in determining ???????????????????????????
in the four forms of R&D collaboration described above (COLLFIRMS, 
COLLCENTRES, COLLUNI and COLLOTHER). R&D firms may also choose 
no cooperation at all. Firms attempting to maximise profits select the 
cooperation strategy from the alternatives which is best suited to do this. 
The profit related to each strategy is an unobservable factor and is 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
final choice can be observed from the dataset. 
The type of collaboration chosen by the firm will most likely be 
determined by several factors such as the industry, the technological level 
??? ???? ?????????? ?????? ???? ???? ?????? ??? ???? ??????? ?????????? ?????????
Thus there might be differences in the various types of cooperative 
R&D.  
In the sample used here there is no information about characteristics 
of the partners for each cooperative agreement. Nevertheless, it is very 
likely that cooperation agreements involve partners with different R&D 
intensity and ???????????? ???? ???? ????????????? ??? ?? ??????? ???????? ??? ???
gain complementary assets and skills, asymmetric partnerships may be 
the best strategy. Conversely if the reason for cooperation is to 
internalize outgoing spillovers or to increase market share, symmetric 
partnerships may be more likely (Busom and Ribas, 2007). Firms with 
high-intensity R&D have a higher level of knowledge appropriation and 
are therefore less worried about the inherent risks of sharing knowledge 
that are part and parcel of partnerships. 
The following details the specification of the multivariate probit 
model (MVP) that is used to fit the distribution of different 
collaboration-types. The model is computed for four binary choice 
equations equal to one if the firm is committed to any of the R&D 
partnerships described above.2 Conditional on there being at least one 
                                                 
2 Fritsch and Lukas (2001), distinguish between cooperation customers, 
suppliers, other firms and public funded research institutions and find some 
evidence for the notion that the propensity to cooperate with different kinds of 
partners is driven by the same factors. 
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form of cooperation, it can be observed any 2COLLi,M? 1 combinations of 
the M different claim-types. There are then four dependent variables 
COLLi,M and the MVP can be specified as a linear combination of 
















     (1) 
i=1,....,N represent the independent observations. Xi,M are the 
explanatory variables which do not differ for each collaboration-type 
(the deterministic component) and ?M are parameters, including an 
intercept, to be estimated. ?iM are error terms distributed as multivariate 
normal, each with a mean of zero, and variance?covariance matrix ?. 
The stochastic component may be thought of as consisting of those 
unobservable factors which explain the marginal probability of making a 
type M collaboration: ?i,M ~ N (0, ?). 
? is the covariance matrix with values of 1 on the leading diagonal and 
because of symmetry in covariances, it necessarily has correlations 
?jM=?Mj as off-diagonal elements: 
? ??? ? ???
??? ? ? ???
? ? ? ?
??? ??? ? ?
 
 
     (2) 
?jM, represents the unobserved correlation between the stochastic 
component of jth and Mth types of collaboration. It is worth underlining 
that this covariance matrix is similar to that of the multinomial probit, 
except the variances here are normalized to unity.  
The rational for the joint estimation of correlated collaboration-
types is in the possibility to estimate the joint probabilities of the 
outcomes. The error terms may be correlated because of omitted 
variables in the choice process. If such a possibility is neglected, for 
example by running separate probit equations, the estimators are likely to 
be inefficient. Actually what is at stake is the joint probability of possible 
non-independent outcomes. If there is dependence, the estimate picks 
some bivariate joint distribution where a coefficient (rho) measures the 
extent to which the two distributions are correlated. The estimate 
includes the set of explanatory variables of the four equations in order to 
check if their impact on the R&D partnership strategies considered is 
different. 
In the specific case of four choices M=4, the quadrivariate probit 
case, the log-likelihood function for a sample of N independent 














where wi is an optional weight for observation i= 1, . . . , N. ?4 (.) is the 










11 iiiiiiiii XKXKXKXK ????? ?    (4)	  
with KiM = 2COLLi,M ?1 for each i, and M=1, ..,4. Matrix ? has constituent 
elements ?jM, where: 
?M M =  1 for M =  1, ..,4 
?21 =  ?12 =  K i2 K i1 ?21 
?31 =  ?13 =  K i3 K i1 ?31 
?32 =  ?23 =  K i3 K i2 ?32 
?41 =  ?14 =  K i4 K i1 ?41 
?42 =  ?24 =  K i4 K i2 ?42 







In the empirical analysis the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) 
smooth recursive conditioning simulator is used to compute the 
maximum likelihood function. This also offers options for cross-
equation tests and restrictions in parameters (Böorsch and Hajivassiliou, 
1993;; Geweke et al. 1997;; Hajivassiliou et al. 1996). The results are 
obtained with a Stata routine and are based on 200 random draws from 
the truncated standard normal distribution (Cappellari and Jenkins, 
2003). 
The GHK simulator is based on the fact that a multivariate normal 
distribution function can be represented as the product of sequentially 
conditioned univariate normal distribution functions. The ???? ????????
command estimates M-equation probit models by the simulated 
maximum likelihood method (SML). The off-diagonal elements in the 
variance-covariance matrix of the cross-equation error terms are 
correlations that have to be estimated (?jM)?? ???????????????? ????????
simulator to evaluate the M-dimensional normal integrals in the 
likelihood function. For each observation, a likelihood contribution is 
calculated for each replication, and the simulated likelihood contribution 
is the average of the values obtained from all the replications. The 
simulated likelihood function for the whole sample is then maximized 
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using maximum likelihood methods. The number of draws specifies the 
number of random variates drawn when calculating the simulated 
likelihood. 
This simulator represents an accurate tool to compute the multiple 
integrals in multivariate probit models with more than two dependent 
variables. Due to these multiple integrals the maximum likelihood 
method cannot be applied so that the incorporation of the simulator into 
the maximum likelihood method can be used for the parameter 
estimation. 
 
4.1 Estimation results 
Table (3) shows the results of the multivariate probit.3 The 
correlation coefficients of the equation error terms (rho) in the 
multivariate probit are statistically significant except for the 
COLLCENTRES-COLLFIRMS coefficient. This supports the hypothesis of 
interdependence between the four cooperation decisions considered in 
this sample of 1231 Italian firms. Interestingly, when there are 
universities among the partners, the sign of the correlation for the 
equation error terms coefficients is always positive, indicating 
complementarities among R&D collaboration strategies. 
 Correlations become negative for the remaining combinations, 
suggesting substitution effects between partnership with small centres, 
and with both institutional research centres and other firms. Coefficients 
also differ appreciably across the equations, revealing that the 
cooperation strategies are quite heterogeneous, hence the 
appropriateness of the disaggregate cooperation decision analysis. The 
robustness of the model is checked by applying the Wald test on the 
hypothesis that the four equations have equal slope coefficients (table 
A.2).4 The test allows to reject the null hypothesis suggesting that the 
four cooperation strategies considered in the analysis are heterogeneous 
enough and it is appropriate to consider them separately in this sample 
(Fritsch and Lukas, 2001;; Janz et al. 2003). 
                                                 
3Alternatively, the cooperation decision can be specified as a sequential process 
where firms decide whether they cooperate or not in the first step and 
successively decide which form of cooperation. However, a sequential process 
would imply that the profits of cooperation strategies at the second stage do not 
influence cooperation decision of the first stage which does not seem to be 
realistic (Bonte and Keilbach, 2005).  
4Given the strong heterogeneity on the variable coefficients the test is carried 




The analysis shows that participating to a public R&D programme 
????????????????????????????????????????????? ? ?????????????????????????????
cooperate with universities and other firms, although it does not affect 
the two other forms of partnership. This result is even more significant 
in its implications for government policies, especially when one 
considers that the research incentives studied in this work do not 
explicitly require any prior joint research activity.  
The researchers intensity measure positively affects the probability 
of partnerships but not in the case of collaboration with research centres. 
Apart from this latter case, which is somewhat surprising, the results 
confirm that stable research expenditure may be an incentive for firms to 
share the risks and costs of R&D activities with external partners.5 This 
supports the hypothesis that there is a positive interaction between 
internal technical capability and collaboration with external partners. 
Firm size has a positive and significant impact on the choice of a 
strategy with the exception of partnerships with small centres. The 
capital intensity variable does not offer a clear cut off. It is negative for 
alliances with small centres, positive for universities and non-significant 
for the other two. Being credit rationed, export oriented or receiving 
other forms of public support have no impact on their choice of 
strategy.  
Interestingly, the effect of the outsourcing variable on collaboration 
is positive only for partnership with other firms. This seems to support 
the hypothesis that firms relying on outsourcing agreements for their 
production can take advantage of the intra-industry network they are 
part of. For the other forms of collaboration outsourcing shows to be 
highly insignificant. 
Finally, industry dummies suggest that there are some sectoral 
differences in all the equations with the exception of partnerships with 
small centres. To be more precise, the analysis shows that high-tech and 
also mid-high-tech firms are more keen to participate in R&D 
partnerships than do firms in less technologically advanced sectors 
(coefficients are always negative). Differences in the probability of R&D 
collaboration among industries are confirmed by the test of joint 
significance of the industry dummy variables. 
For comparison, individual univariate probit results are also reported 
in the appendix (table A.3). There is only a small difference in the 
coefficients when compared to the multivariate results. This can be 
                                                 
5 It is worth noting that Miotti and Sachwald (2003) and Cassiman and 
Veugelers (2002) find that a firm's permanent R&D does not affect its 
propensity to cooperate with vertically related firms. 
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explained by the fact that the correlations between the equation error 
terms (rho) in the multivariate probit estimate, though almost all are 
significant, are relatively small in size. Nevertheless the Likelihood Ratio 
test confirms the superiority of the MVP over the single independent 
probit model (?2(12)=58.302;; Prob>?2(12)=0.000). The same table also 
depicts the results for the aggregated group of firms with at least one 
R&D cooperation (COLLALL) and further confirms the hypothesis of 
heterogeneity in collaboration.   
 
5 Concluding remarks 
This work presents empirical evidence on the determining factors 
?????????????D cooperation strategies, based on a sample of 1231 Italian 
manufacturing firms. Four types of collaboration are considered jointly: 
collaboration with other firms, with research institutions, universities and 
other small centres. A multivariate probit model is employed to account 
for the fact that such firms may consider the various forms of 
collaboration simultaneously. This allows for systematic correlations 
between choices of different forms of cooperation and allows for the 
fact that firms may consider different cooperation agreements 
simultaneously. 
The results support the idea of interdependence between the four 
cooperation decisions considered in this sample. In particular, when 
there are universities among the partners there are significant 
correlations between the equations in the model, which indicates that the 
various R&D cooperation decisions tend to be viewed by the firms as 
complementary. Correlations become negative for the remaining 
combinations, which suggest that there is a substitution effect between 
partnership with small centres, and with both institutional research 
centres and other firms.  
The analysis also shows that that determining factors for R&D 
cooperation differ significantly across the cooperation options 
considered, which suggests that the cooperation strategies are quite 
heterogeneous. This reinforces the appropriateness of the multivariate 
analysis used in this work.  
Estimation results show that receiving public R&D support has a 
????????? ? ????? ??? ?? ??????? ????????? ??? ??????ate with universities and 
other firms, while it does not affect the two other forms of joint research 
activity. Larger numbers of researchers increases the probability of 
partnerships, except in the case of collaboration with research centres. 
Apart from this latter case, this essentially confirms the idea that stable 
R&D activity might encourage firms to share the risks and costs of 
research. This is in line with the idea that an effective absorption capacity 
17 
 
is required to understand and use effectively knowledge coming from 
external partners. 
Firm size has a positive impact on the choice of a strategy, with the 
exception of partnerships with small centres, while the capital intensity 
variable does not supply a clear cut off point. Credit constraints, export 
orientation and being the recipient of other forms of public support have 
no impact on the choice of collaboration strategy. Finally industry 
differences emerge in all the equations, with the exception of partnership 
with small centres.  
Although the cross-sectional structure of the data does not allow 
long term considerations, the analysis supplies some implications for 
policy. In particular, public aid specifically aimed at research activity 
plays an important and significant role in increasing a ???????????????????
to share its know-how. Public financial support tends to have a positive 
influence on a firm's R&D spending and indirectly influences the 
propensity to co-operate in R&D. In the sample of Italian firms used 
here, public grants appear to be significantly influential in strengthening 
both the private-private (with other firms) and private-public (with 
universities) relationships. This may represent a crucial competitive 
condition in research activity. From this perspective it can represent an 
important tool to help firms to overcoming their financial constraints 
deriving from market failures in real and financial markets. By contrast 
public financial aid not specifically aimed at R&D does not have a 
statistically significant influence on collaboration supporting the need of 
dedicated R&D public policy to incentivate joint research activity. 
Lastly, particularly considering the low commitment to R&D and 
innovation in Italy and the substantial dominance of small-medium sized 
enterprises, significant incentives to research and policies aimed at 
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GRANTOTHER =1 if firm has received other types of public 

























EXTSOU =1 if firm has purchased input goods and services 





























































































(*)161 firms have multiple cooperation forms       
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COLLCENTRES  (only) 74 
COLLFIRMS  (only) 215 
COLLOTHER  (only) 102 




COLLCENTRES  & COLLFIRMS  (only) 16 
COLLCENTRES  & COLLOTHER (only) 3 
COLLCENTRES  & COLLUNI  (only) 29 
COLLFIRMS  & COLLOTHER (only) 14 
COLLFIRMS  & COLLUNI  (only) 14 




COLLCENTRES  & COLLFIRMS  & COLLOTHER (only) 2 
COLLCENTRES  & COLLFIRMS & COLLUNI  (only) 13 
COLLFIRMS  & COLLOTHER & COLLUNI  (only) 3 



























Table 3:  Multivariate probit regressions on R& D collaboration 
 COLLCENTRES COLLFIRMS COLLOTHER COLLUNI 
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) 
GRANTR&D -0,004 (0,107) 0,305*** (0,086) 0,078 (0,103) 0,330*** (0,101) 
LogEMPR&D-EMPL(2001) 0,033 (0,037) 0,098*** (0,031) 0,060 (0,038) 0,087** (0,037) 
LogEMP2001 0,225*** (0,048) 0,103*** (0,041) -0,042 (0,049) 0,299*** (0,047) 
Log(KAPINT)2001 0,067 (0,049) 0,052 (0,041) -0,094** (0,045) 0,139*** (0,052) 
DEBTAVY 0,000 (0,034) -0,061* (0,039) 0,007 (0,039) 0,078 (0,057) 
RATION  0,079 (0,197) 0,065 (0,161) 0,208 (0,180) -0,318 (0,229) 
EXPORT  -0,085 (0,162) 0,025 (0,133) 0,242 (0,163) -0,160 (0,159) 
GRANTOTHER -0,108 (0,134) 0,085 (0,104) 0,150 (0,121) 0,174 (0,123) 
EXTSOU 0,015 (0,114) 0,301*** (0,092) -0,022 (0,112) 0,059 (0,113) 
PAVITT1 -0,510*** (0,196) -0,077 (0,174) 0,148 (0,220) -0,689*** (0,190) 
PAVITT2 -0,453** (0,221) -0,409** (0,201) 0,181 (0,243) -0,487** (0,212) 
PAVITT 3 -0,308 (0,194) -0,154 (0,176) 0,045 (0,222) -0,373** (0,188) 
Cons -1,862*** (0,318) -1,091*** (0,270) -0,926*** (0,324) -2.311*** (0.321) 
rho21 -0.036 (0.066)       
rho31 -0.133* (0.081)       
rho41 0.378*** (0.064)       
rho32 -0.180*** (0.064)       
rho42 0.137** (0.063)       
rho43 0.206*** (0.072)       
# of obs.  1231        
Log likelihood -1918.21        
Wald ?2 (48) 181.48***        
Wald test on joint 
ignificance 
of industry dummies  
?2 (12) 
31.18***  
      
Likelihood ratio test of  rho21 = rho31 = rho41 = rho32 = rho42 = rho43 = 0:  ?2 (6)= 58.3031, 
Prob>?2=0.0000 
# of random draws in the simulator = 200 
* Significant at 10%. 
** Significant at 5%. 










Table A .1: Durbin?Wu?Hausman (augmented regression test) for endogeneity 
Equation Estimated coefficient  of residuals t value 
GRANTR&D(residuals) .22 0.47 
Hy: coeff. residuals = 0   
F (1,  1221) = 0.22 
Prob> F =  0.64   













Table A .2: testing results  
 
Constrain: 
Wald tests  
H0: equality of slope coefficients (?x
s) 
?x
s, COLLCENTRES = ?xs, COLLFIRMS ?2(12)= 27.12;  Prob>?2 = 0.007 
?x
s, COLLCENTRES = ?xs, COLLOTHER ?2 (12)= 37.05;   Prob>?2 = 0.000 
?x
s, COLLCENTRES = ?xs, COLLUNI ?2 (12)= 19.89;   Prob>?2 = 0.069 
?x
s, COLLFIRMS= ?xs, COLLOTHER ?2 (12)= 25.78;   Prob>?2 = 0.011 
?x
s, COLLFIRMS= ?xs, COLLUNI ?2 (12)= 39.99;   Prob>?2 = 0.000 
?x

























Table A .2:  single univariate probit regressions on R & D collaboration  
 COLLALL COLLCENTRES COLLFIRMS COLLOTHER COLLUNI 
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) 
GRANTR&D 0,229*** (0,081) -0,004 (0,107) 0,304*** (0,086) 0,082 (0,103) 0,336 (0,101) 
LogEMPR&D-EMPL(2001) 0,143*** (0,029) 0,034 (0,038) 0,100*** (0,032) 0,062* (0,038) 0,079 (0,037) 
LogEMP2001 0,134*** (0,038) 0,224*** (0,047) 0,104*** (0,040) -0,042 (0,049) 0,300 (0,047) 
Log(KAPINT)2001 0,034 (0,037) 0,067 (0,050) 0,050 (0,041) -0,095** (0,046) 0,141 (0,052) 
DEBTAVY -0,046 (0,035) -0,001 (0,034) -0,061* (0,038) 0,008 (0,039) 0,062 (0,057) 
RATION  0,051 (0,151) 0,067 (0,198) 0,059 (0,162) 0,200 (0,181) -0,278 (0,228) 
EXPORT  0,044 (0,119) -0,094 (0,161) 0,026 (0,133) 0,235 (0,163) -0,145 (0,160) 
GRANTOTHER 0,205** (0,098) -0,084 (0,132) 0,089 (0,104) 0,162 (0,121) 0,171 (0,123) 
EXTSOU 0,212** (0,087) 0,007 (0,114) 0,306*** (0,091) -0,019 (0,112) 0,054 (0,113) 
PAVITT1 -0,257 (0,169) -0,508*** (0,195) -0,076 (0,174) 0,163 (0,222) -0,697 (0,191) 
PAVITT2 -0,388 (0,188) -0,470** (0,221) -0,406** (0,201) 0,208 (0,244) -0,501 (0,214) 
PAVITT 3 -0,251 (0,17) -0,318* (0,194) -0,152 (0,176) 0,061 (0,224) -0,390 (0,189) 
Cons -0,281 (0,248) -1,844*** (0,315) -1,087*** (0,269) -0,930*** (0,324) -2,332 (0,323) 
# of obs.  1231  1231  1231  1231  1231  
Log likelihood -819.52  -421.02  -658.43  -445.93  -422.01  
Wald test on joint 
significance 
of industry dummies  
?2 (3) 
4.34  8.21**  7.12*  1.69  16.02***  
* Significant at 10%. 
** Significant at 5%. 
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